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7FOREWORD
Wiretapping and tailing of suspects are the traditional mainstays of security service 
activity. However, the multiplication and growing complexity of security threats and 
risks, as well as development of technology and communications has led to an in-
crease in the number and variety of techniques used to covertly gather data, such 
as secretly accessing people’s communications. Additionally, the number of govern-
ment bodies and institutions implementing such measures has grown beyond the 
police and security services to include, for example, the Administration for the Pre-
vention of Money Laundering and has also come to include private detective and 
investigative agencies. Today such measures are no longer applied only for preven-
tative intelligence gathering but also in the course of criminal proceedings. The situ-
ation is further confounded by the fact that these activities are governed by a vast 
number of (unintegrated) regulations and by decreasing understanding of this field, 
both by the general public and by professionals. This is best illustrated by the fact 
that lawmakers use a variety of terms to define such measures in legislation: “special 
procedures and measures” (Law on the VBA and VOA), “special measures infringing 
on the privacy of correspondence and other communications” (Law on the BIA) and 
“special investigative activity” (Criminal Procedure Code).
The increasing number of covert data collection measures; the growing number of 
actors applying and approving them; the ever multiplying regulations governing 
their use and oversight; as well as disagreement on the terminology used to define 
them combine to make even basic understanding of these measures difficult. This 
publication aims to contribute to better understanding of this field as the basis for its 
more systematic and effective oversight. The first section of the handbook explains 
what special covert data collection measures are and what conditions are necessary 
for their application. The second section of the handbook is devoted to the various 
institutions authorised to deploy these measures in Serbia. This section also con-
tains information on the different measures applied by various institutions, the legal 
conditions that must be met for their use and the actors tasked with their approval 
and oversight. The third section presents all of the institutions tasked with oversight 
and approval of these measures and reviews the powers available to them. The last 
section of the handbook lists the most important questions members of National 
Assembly committees for security sector oversight should be asking the security ser-
vices and the judiciary in reviewing the use of covert data collection measures. Re-
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sponses to these questions should yield information fundamental to the continued 
systematic oversight of this area. 
The handbook is primarily aimed at the members of the National Assembly Security 
Services Control Committee and the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee, as their 
considerable security sector oversight powers put them in a position to make im-
mediate use of this handbook. Furthermore, the handbook can also be of use to the 
interested public and organisations whose work intersects with these issues.
The handbook was created as part of the project, “Who Controls the Wire: Towards 
the Effective External Oversight of the Use of Special Investigative Measures”, but is 
founded on the many years of experience and specialised knowhow attained in this 
field by the BCSP team.
SPECIAL MEASURES FOR 
COVERT DATA COLLECTION
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What are Special Measures for Covert Data Collection?
Special measures for covert data collection are defined as those methods of data 
collection that remain hidden from the persons, groups or organisations that are 
subject to investigation. All of these special measures can be divided into two main 
categories:
1. Those whose use has a lessened or negligible impact on human rights and free-
doms. This group includes traditional operational measures such as interview-
ing the subject; covertly tailing or recording subjects; infiltration of groups and 
organisations; and accessing documents, public records or other data collection 
by public authorities. With the development of various forms of communication, 
there was an increase in the importance of public sources of data collection so 
the security services and police also collect and analyse data from the media, TV 
and the internet.
2. Those measures whose use significantly infringes upon human rights, particu-
larly the right to privacy. These are usually measures that provide insight into 
the content of all forms of communication but also those measures that gener-
ate statistical data on past communications (i.e. access to stored data) and this 
category also includes covert domicile searches as one of the most aggressive 
special measures for covert data collection. 
Who is authorised to use these special measures?
Use of special measures for covert data collection is an essential working tool for 
security services and the police, without which their work would be impossible to 
imagine. Over the past two decades, however, the number of bodies authorised to 
apply such measures has been on the rise and has come to include tax and customs 
authorities, agencies and administrative bodies for the prevention of money laun-
dering, each of which has the power to apply certain special data collection meas-
ures. The reason behind this trend is twofold. First, there was a sharp increase in 
international (organised) crime, smuggling, tax evasion and money laundering, so 
there was a need to take measures to enable the investigation of these offences.
Secondly, the aforementioned authorities are becoming more independent or less 
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dependent on the police and security services in conducting certain investigations.1 
The rapid rise of (organised) crime and industrial espionage,2 combined with state 
security institutions’ lack of resources to respond to these phenomena, has resulted 
in non-state organisations and private companies that provide security services (pri-
vate investigation and detective agencies) gaining powers to apply certain measures 
of covert data collection. Laws3 usually entitle private security companies to col-
lect data via interviews, public records and other sources of public data, and also to 
tail subjects. It is not uncommon, however, for these companies to use significantly 
more intrusive methods in pursuit of profits, including wiretapping. This illegal prac-
tice has become possible due to the availability of affordable and accessible pow-
erful listening devices and due to relatively loose government regulation of private 
security companies.
Why are these special measures applied?
State authorities have two main rationales for collecting data covertly. The first be-
ing to protect or advance national security or to prevent risks and threats to the se-
curity of the public, society and state institutions as well as, above all, the protection 
of the most vital economic and other interests of the society and the state. These 
threats can be the product of various individuals and groups (e.g. extremists, ter-
rorists, etc.) both from within society and external to it. This involves collection of 
data and information on the activities, plans or intentions of various domestic and 
foreign state and non-state actors; the processing and analysis of said data; and its 
timely delivery to various users, primarily state officials, in order to enable them to 
make decisions correctly. Prevention is the key, therefore, as the primary goal is the 
interception of various threats to the interests of the state and society before they 
are realised. Data collection with this aim in mind is the fundamental raison d’être of 
security and intelligence services. 
The second application of special measures is covert collection of data for the pro-
cessing of a variety of (usually serious) criminal offences through the courts. This 
1  See more in: Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović (Ed.), Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih ovlašćenja, CCVO, Belgrade, 
2008.
2  How Real Is the Risk of Corporate Espionage Today? Security Director’s Report, Institute of Management & Administration, April 
2009. 
3  In Serbia it Law on Detective Activity, Art.10. 11. and 12.
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kind of data collection is typical for police and other law enforcement bodies but 
also for the security services. Over the last two decades, however, due to increases 
in (international) organised crime and its links with terrorism, extremism and other 
security threats4, the security services in some (mostly) transition states have come 
to be involved in the investigation of criminal offences. Other causes for this can be 
sought in the fact that these services descend from an authoritarian historical lega-
cy, a characteristic of which is that security services perform a significant quantity of 
police work (hence the term secret police).
There has, however, been a reverse trend which sees police structures implementing 
special measures aimed at prevention of organised crime. Some states have, there-
fore, established special units within police structures while others have formed 
special, independent police agencies with the aim of preventatively collecting data 
on the activities and intentions of organised crime groups (e.g. the British National 
Crime Agency).
Today, at a time of rapid, global expansion of private companies that provide se-
curity services, it is worth discussing a third, commercial purpose behind data col-
lection that sees private security companies collecting data on behalf of the private 
citizens and governmental clients who award them contracts. The services on offer 
are diverse and include verification of spouse fidelity; finding missing persons and 
property; gathering forensic evidence; counterintelligence and security protection 
for companies and businesses; commercial viability checks and similar. Over the last 
decade there has been a trend, led by Western states, of government authorities en-
gaging private intelligence gathering agencies o collect all kinds of data relating to 
national security.5
4  Frank G. Madsen, Transnational Organized Crime, Routledge, London, 2009, pp. 62-80.
5  Patrick M. Skinner, This Disaster Happened Because the CIA Outsourced Accountability, TIME, December 10, 2014, internet: 
http://time.com/3627834/torture-report-cia-contractors/, app.: 10.02.2015. 
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Who authorises the application of special measures?
Special measures for covert data collection that have a lower impact on human 
rights (e.g. secret surveillance in public spaces) can be authorised by the heads of in-
telligence and security services or police chiefs, as well as public prosecutors (in the 
case of controlled delivery)6. However, the application of special measures that have 
a more significant impact on human rights (such as covert communications monitor-
ing) require authorisation by an independent body other than the body applying the 
measures, most often a court. In this eventuality the security or intelligence service 
and the public prosecutor (if the application of special measures is related to crimi-
nal proceedings) propose the application of such measures and then seek written 
judicial approval. 7
A PROPOSAL FOR APPLICATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES MUST INCLUDE:
•	 The type of measure to be applied
•	 Available information on the individual, group or organisation subject to the special 
measures
•	 Compliance with conditions on the application of special measures (reasonable 
suspicion)
•	 The scope of measures and the location of their application
•	 The timeframe for application
DETERMINATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES TO BE USED INCLUDES:
•	 The type of measure
•	 Available information on the individual, group or organisation subject to the special 
measures
•	 Compliance with conditions on the application of special measures (reasonable 
suspicion)
•	 Method of application
•	 Scope and timeframe for application
6  The Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 181., Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency Art. 13., Law on the 
Security-Information Agency Art. 9.
7  See: The criminal procedure law  Art. 145, “Special Investigative Activities”  Art.161-187, Art. 286; Law on Military Security Agency 
and Military Intelligence Agency Art. 13a-14; Law on the Security-Information Agency Art. 15-15a.
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Less stringent legal standards apply for the use of special measures by private inves-
tigators and detective agencies as they are legally only authorised to make use of 
less intrusive measures. These agencies, therefore, only require written authorisa-
tion on the part of their clients to apply data collection measures. These agencies 
then submit requests for information to the relevant bodies/institutions (e.g. hospi-
tals). Private companies and agencies must, of course, be registered and licensed to 
conduct such investigative activities and their employees must have special identi-
fication for that purpose8.
DATA ACCESS REQUESTS FOR PRIVATE DETECTIVE AGENCIES MUST CONTAIN:
•	 The name and address of the registered agency;
•	 The type of data sought;
•	 A commencement date for processing, i.e. they must specify which data is being col-
lected;
•	 A reason for seeking access (justification);
•	 The legal foundation for granting access (authorisation by the client);
•	 The name and address of the client.
Image 1: Flow chart showing process of recommending and approving 
measures applied by the security services
8  Law on Detective Activity, Art. 13.
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Conditions for the application of special measures
Given that special measures of this kind are a covert and exceptionally intrusive 
means of data collection, certain conditions must be fulfilled for their application:
 ■ The measures should be clearly defined and lawful;
 ■ There should be a clearly prescribed procedure for their approval, oversight and 
supervision;
 ■ Principles of independent oversight and approval must be maintained;
 ■ The special measures applied should be necessary and proportionate.9
For the application of special measures to be valid, they must be clearly defined by 
primary, rather than secondary, legislation. This implies that the special measures 
must be sanctioned, the conditions for their application and the procedures for their 
approval clearly defined and the oversight body clearly determined. It is also impor-
tant that approval of measures is carried out independently, that the body propos-
ing the implementation of special measures is separate from the body that approves 
their use. Furthermore, the body that approves the use of special measures signifi-
cantly impacting human rights (secret communications tapping, etc.) must be also 
be other than the body that proposes their use, in most cases this is a court.
In addition to meeting these formal principles and conditions, it is also of great im-
portance that the essential conditions for their use be met. Principally, it is necessary 
for there to be reasonable suspicion that the targeted person, group or organisa-
tion is involved in activity that threatens the security or interests of the state and 
of society or is otherwise commissioning or has already committed a serious crime. 
Secondly, it is important that these offences cannot, without causing undue diffi-
culties, be detected, prevented or proven using means other than special investiga-
tive measures. In practice, this means that the security services and police cannot 
gather evidence in any other way or that the investigation would be delayed if other 
means are used. It is important, therefore, that the application of special investiga-
tive measures is necessary or that only through their application can a legitimate 
interest or goal be protected or realised.
9  See: Criminal Procedure Code, art. 161., Law on the Security-Information Agency, Art 14.
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For the proper use of these measures, however, it is not only important that their 
application is deemed necessary but that they are applied in proportion to the goal 
sought. Thus, it should always be determined whether the specific measure applied 
(and not all measures in general) will lead to the successful realisation of the goal 
or whether the objective can also be reached by application of other measures less 
restrictive to human rights. Also, the application of special investigative measures 
should not extend to other entities; neither should their use be prolonged without 
valid justification. Moreover, as a rule the application of special investigative meas-
ures must cease prior to the deadline set for their use or upon achieving the purpose 
for which they were applied.
Reasonable suspicion reflects a set of evidence – i.e. facts and circumstances – which sug-
gests that a person, group or organisation is preparing acts directed against the security 
and interests of the state and of society, or are otherwise in the process of commissioning a 
serious crime. Reasonable suspicion is the starting point of an investigation by state authori-
ties and must not, therefore, be mere conjecture or speculation but should contain a degree 
of likelihood. It must be based on at least two sources, indicating that the relevant actors 
are possible security threats or offenders. If we take high-risk events as an example, general 
suspicion would be that there will be incidents at a Serbia vs. Albania football match. Rea-
sonable suspicion would, in this case, be specific information (obtained through operational 
activities) that some persons are preparing an incident using a drone, which would justify the 
application of specific measures to counter this threat.
18
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The Most Common Errors in Authorisation of Special Measures
For unconsolidated democracies with extremely weak institutions (particularly the 
judiciary) it is not uncommon for frequent errors to occur in the approval of special 
investigative measures.10 This results in unjustified violations of the human rights of 
persons who are, without a valid basis, targeted by special investigative measures. 
If the purpose of the special investigative measures is to collect evidence of criminal 
activity, errors in their approval can lead to their being inadmissible in court and can 
jeopardise the outcome of the case. Errors in the approval of special investigative 
measures are manifold:
 ■ Errors in the form and content of orders requesting special investigative measures;
 ■ Incorrect assessment of ‘reasonable suspicion’,
 ■ Incorrect assessment of the necessity or proportionality of certain measures for 
the successful conclusion of the investigation (it may not have been necessary to 
apply special measures or it may have been necessary to apply other measures);
 ■ Incorrect calculation of deadlines for the expiry of special measures.
Hence, it is of critical importance that all bodies involved in processes of recommen-
dation, approval and oversight ensure, in as much detail as is possible, that all afore-
mentioned conditions are met, not only for the application of special investigative 
measures in general but also for each specific measure.
Who Oversees and Reviews the Application of Measures?
As has been mentioned, the courts are, for a number of reasons, the most impor-
tant institution that can exercise oversight and review the application of special 
measures. Firstly, the courts approve measures and can deny their application if the 
statutory requirements are not met. They can also order the destruction of materi-
als collected through the application of these measures if criminal proceedings are 
dropped or if the measures were not applied in accordance with the law. Finally, 
the security services and police are obliged to submit reports to the courts about 
applied measures and evidence gathered through their application – or earlier if so 
10  Read more: Silvija Panović-Đurić, Primena specijalnih istražnih sredstava, Council of Europe Office in Belgrade, Belgrade, 2013.
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requested by the court.11 The Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Information 
of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection can initiate a review of the legal-
ity and propriety of special investigative measures if they receive a request to do so 
from members of the public or independently (ex officio) if they become aware of hu-
man rights violations. Representatives of both institutions have access to informa-
tion classified at the highest level (“state secret”) for which they are cleared through 
security checks.
On the other hand, the National Assembly’s Security Services Control Committee is 
authorised to exercise post factum oversight of the implementation of special inves-
tigative measures. The primary aim of this type of control is the elimination of sys-
tematic weaknesses and legal irregularities by amendment of procedures and regu-
lations, if these are found wanting.12
Furthermore, all bodies able to apply special measures (security services or police) 
have their own internal affairs departments that, in spite of being a form of ‘self-
control’, are actually the first line of defence of the integrity of these institutions. In 
Serbia, however, these internal control mechanisms are underdeveloped and pro-
duce only very modest results.
11  In case of three types of special measures. See more in the chapter Judicial Review.
12  Parliamentary oversight of the security services is currently regulated in detail by a decision, which is non-binding for future 
convocations, as the Rules of Procedure do not foresee that committees adopt own regulation. See: National Assembly of the Re-
public of Serbia – Security Services Control Committee “Decision Regulating Direct Oversight of the Security Services in Accordance 
with the Law Regulating the Basic Organisation of the Security Services of the Republic of Serbia, the Laws on the Security Services 
and the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly. Number 02-1322/13” Belgrade, 29 March 2013.
AGENCIES APPLYING SPECIAL 
MEASURES
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The Security-Information Agency
The Security-Information Agency (BIA) is a civilian, national and central security ser-
vice of the Republic of Serbia. Its responsibilities define it as a ‘mixed’ type of securi-
ty service due to the fact that it carries out both intelligence and counter-intelligence 
tasks but also functions as a security service.  Additionally, when performing some 
tasks, BIA operatives are authorised to apply police-like powers, including the right 
of arrest. These tasks include detection, monitoring, prevention and interdiction of 
the activities of organisations and persons engaging in organised crime and criminal 
acts linked to foreign and domestic terrorism, crimes against humanity, breaches 
of international law and also threats to the constitutional order and the security of 
the Republic of Serbia.13 The Director of the BIA is appointed and discharged by the 
Government.14
The BIA applies covert data collection measures preventatively, in order to counter 
national security threats but also to prosecute criminal acts through the courts. The 
special measures, determined by the Criminal Law Code, which the BIA applies, are 
presented on page 33.
13  Law on the Security-Information Agency Art. 2.
14  Law on the Security-Information Agency Art. 5.
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Table 1: Security-Information Agency - Measures Authorised by Courts
Legal Framework Law on Security-Information Agency
Measures:
1. covert surveillance and communications tapping regardless of the tech-
nology used or the electronic/real-world address;
2. covert surveillance and communications tapping in public places and 
places where access is restricted or in internal spaces;
3. statistical electronic surveillance of communications and information 
systems with the aim of collecting data on communications or locations 
where mobile technology has been used;
4. computer searches of processed personal and other information and 
comparative analysis with data collected using the aforementioned 
means;
5. covert surveillance and recording of locations, premises and objects, 
including equipment for automatic data processing and equipment that 
stores or can store electronic records.
Approved by:
Applied on proposal by the Director of the BIA and approved by the Presi-
dent of the Belgrade High Court, or a judge selected from that court’s Special 
Department for Combating Organised Crime.
Duration: 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Applied in cases of: Threats to the national security of the Republic of Serbia
Application 
overseen by:
The respective courts are not authorised to exercise oversight of the applica-
tion of these measures nor is the BIA obliged to submit reports on how the 
measures are applied
What happens to 
the information 
that is collected?
Upon conclusion of the investigation the BIA is not required by law to de-
stroy data collected by the application of these measures.
Table 2: Security-Information Agency - Measures Authorised by Director
Legal Framework: Covert Regulative Legislation Passed by the Director of the BIA
Measures:
•	 covert search of premises, belongings and objects;
•	 covert cooperation
•	 covert surveillance and monitoring
Approved by: The Director of the BIA
Duration --
Applied in cases of: Threats to the security of the Republic of Serbia or according to the needs of criminal investigations
Application 
overseen by: Self-control by the BIA
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The Military Security Agency
The Military Security Agency (VBA) is responsible for security, counter-intelligence 
and counter-terrorism relating to the Serbian Armed Forces and the Ministry of De-
fence. As part of its counter-intelligence functions, among other things, the VBA em-
ploys detection, investigation and documentation of criminal offences committed 
against the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Serbia, as well as 
crimes against humanity and international law and also the most serious criminal 
offences linked to organised crime. Similar to the BIA, the VBA and its operatives 
engaged in the aforementioned activities, can apply police-like powers but not the 
power of arrest. The VBA is part of the Ministry of Defence.15 The VBA Director and 
deputy director are appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of 
the Minister of Defence if the candidate is a civilian. The Director answers to the Min-
ister of Defence.
Measures of covert data collection are applied by the VBA preventatively but also to 
prosecute through the courts those offences committed within the Ministry of De-
fence and the Serbian Armed Forces. Measures applied by the VBA according to the 
Criminal Law Code are presented on page 33 of this handbook.
The VBA is authorised to apply measures of covert data collection on employees of 
the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. When the VBA, in conducting 
these tasks as part of its operations, assesses that these measures should also be ap-
plied to other persons, it must immediately notify the Security-Information Agency 
or the police in order to determine the best way to proceed.16
15  Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency, Art. 2. and 5.
16  Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency, Art 6,para.3.
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Table 3: Military Security Agency - Measures Authorised by Courts
Legal Framework: Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency
Measures:
1. covert electronic surveillance of telecommunications and information 
systems in order to gather data on communications traffic, without 
access to the contents;
2. covert recording and documentation of conversations in public and 
closed spaces, using technical equipment;
3. covert surveillance of the content of letters and other communication, 
including covert electronic surveillance of the content of telecommuni-
cations and information systems;
4. covert surveillance and recording of internal spaces, closed premises 
and objects.
Approved by:
On proposal by the Director of the VBA, measure 1 is approved by a high 
court within the appeals court in the region where it is applied or within 
which the action being detected, monitored and prevented by the VBA. 
These could be high courts in Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kragujevac and Niš.
On proposal by the Director of the VBA, measures 2 to 4 are approved by the 
Supreme Court of Cassation, as authorised by the presiding judge of that 
court.
Duration: 6 months, this can be extended by a further 6 months.
Applied in cases of: Security threats directed against the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces.
Application 
overseen by:
The courts cannot review application of these measures, neither is the VBA 
obliged to submit reports on the application of these measures.
What happens to 
the information 
that is collected?
Once the investigation is concluded, the VBA is not required by law to de-
stroy data gathered by application of these measures.
Note:
The VBA is authorised to apply covert data collection measures exclusively 
on employees of the Ministry of Defence and members of the Serbian Armed 
Forces.
If, in the course of an investigation, the VBA assesses that covert data col-
lection measures should be applied to other persons, it is obliged to im-
mediately inform the Security-Information Agency or the police, in order to 
determine a course of action.
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Table 4: Military Security Agency - Measures Authorised by the Director
Legal Framework: Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency
Measures:
1. operational infiltration of organisations, groups or institutions;
2. covert gathering and acquisition of documents or objects;
3. covert access to databases, in accordance with the law;
4. covert tailing and surveillance of persons in open spaces and public 
places, with use of technical equipment;
5. covert use of services provided by persons or businesses with compen-
sation (article 22, item 4)
Approved by: The Director of the VBA
Duration: --
Applied in cases of: Security threats directed against the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces.
Application 
overseen by:
Self-control – the VBA Internal Control department and the Inspector Gen-
eral of the VBA and VOA
28
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The Military Intelligence Agency
The Military Intelligence Agency (VOA) is authorised to collect, analyse, assess and 
provide data and information (of a military, military-political, military-economic, sci-
entific and technological nature) relating to potential and present threats, activities, 
plans or intentions of foreign states and their armed forces, international and for-
eign organisations, groups and individuals that are directed against the Ministry of 
Defence, the Serbian Armed Forces, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and defence 
of the Republic of Serbia.17 The VOA is part of the Ministry of Defence. The Director 
of the VOA and the deputy directors are appointed and discharged by the President 
of the Republic on recommendation by the Minister of Defence if the candidates are 
professional soldiers or by the Government, on recommendation of the Minister 
of Defence, if the candidates are civilians. The Director answers to the Minister of 
Defence.
The VOA is authorised to apply all special procedures and measures other than cov-
ert optical-electronic monitoring of persons and communications.
Table 5: The Military Intelligence Agency - Measures Approved by the Director 
of the VOA
Legal Framework: Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency
Approved by: The Director of the VOA or persons authorised by the Director
Duration: As long there is a rationale for their application
Applied in cases of:
Data and information on potential and present dangers, activities, plans and 
intentions of foreign states and their armed forces, international organisa-
tions, groups and individuals.
Application 
overseen by:
Self-control – Internal Control department of the VOA and the Inspector 
General of the VBA and VOA
What happens to 
the information 
that is collected?
Once the investigation is concluded, the VOA is not required by law to de-
stroy data gathered through the application of these measures
Note: 
The VOA is not authorised to apply measures of covert data collection that 
significantly impact the privacy of members of the public (e.g. covert elec-
tronic surveillance of telecommunications)
17  Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency, Art. 24-25.
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The Police
The police are the most conspicuous state body responsible for maintaining secu-
rity in society. The complexity of criminal and corruption investigations requires 
the police to infringe on individuals’ right to privacy, including their private home 
or family lives and correspondence. Today police work is more than ever founded 
on covert gathering, processing and use of data to combat security threats. In most 
countries, including in Serbia, the police are legally empowered to apply measures 
of covert data collection in the event that it is not possible to gather information on 
the workings of criminal groups. As a result, police work increasingly requires the 
use of informants, the monitoring and interception of telephone conversations and 
internet communication or the interception of suspicious shipments that are then 
deliberately allowed to reach their destinations.
In Serbia there are several separate units authorised to conduct secret investiga-
tions: the Criminal Force Directorate, the Internal Affairs Sector and the Security Af-
fairs Department within the Office of the Minister of Interior (MoI).
THE CRIMINAL FORCE DIRECTORATE
The Criminal Force Directorate is the department within the police responsible for 
detecting and combating crime. Members of the Criminal Force Directorate may, 
in order to detect offences, apply special evidence gathering techniques and oth-
er measures of covert data collection in accordance with the Constitution, the Law 
on the Police, the Criminal Law Code and the Law on Electronic Communication. 
Specialised units within the Directorate are responsible for applying and coordinat-
ing the application of measures for covert data collection: the Special Investigative 
Methods Service, the Department for Observation and Documentation and the De-
partment for Undercover Investigators.18
18 The Law on Police, Art. 71
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THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECTOR
The Internal Affairs Sector is tasked with investigation of crimes and corruption 
within the police and ensuring the legality of police work. Members of the Sector are 
authorised to apply all police powers, including measures of covert data collection. 
According to the Criminal Procedure Code, members of the Section for Covert Audio 
and Optical Surveillance of Suspects within the Department for Criminal-Operation-
al Affairs of the Internal Affairs Sector are tasked with special investigative activities 
as well as other covert data collection measures19.
THE SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
The Security Affairs Department is seconded to the Office of the Minister of Interior. 
It is tasked with securing the MoI and protecting classified data. In conducting its ac-
tivities it is authorised to apply operational methods prescribed by Criminal Proce-
dure Code and the Law on the Police, these include covert data collection measures. 
The aim is to ensure the security of certain buildings, persons and police functionar-
ies. Providing security involves the use of counter-intelligence to thwart terrorist, ex-
tremist, intelligence and other subversive activities by foreign intelligence services, 
organisations and individuals directed against the Minister of Internal Affairs.
WHICH SPECIAL MEASURES CAN THE POLICE APPLY?
The police can apply ten special data collection measures: (1) surveillance of sus-
picious transactions, (2) covert communications monitoring, (3) covert tailing and 
recording, (4) simulated business activity, (5) computer data searches, (6) controlled 
delivery, (7) undercover agents, (8) acquiring records of telephone conversations, ac-
cessed databases and data on locations where communications have taken place, 
(9) police observation, (10) measures relating to targeted pursuit.
Measures 1-8 are defined by the Criminal Procedure Code and are presented on page 
33 of this handbook.
19  Information booklet about work of Ministry of Interior (in Serbian), updated 25.12.2013.god. p. 12.-14. available on http://www.
mup.gov.rs/cms/resursi.nsf/INFORMATOR%20maj%202015%20LATINICA.pdf
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Table 6: Police Measures that authorised police officers may apply on own 
initiative
Legal Framework Law on the Police
Measure Police Surveillance*
Approved by:
Authorised police officers may implement police surveillance on their 
own initiative, on orders by the superior or as instructed by a competent 
authority.**
Duration: Unlimited
Reason for 
application: Combating crime
Application overseen 
by:  – 
What happens to the 
information that is 
collected?
Used in operations or as evidence
Note: Surveillance is conducted in public and other accessible places without encroaching on the right to privacy.
* The Law on Police, Art. 71
** The Law on Police, Art. 31. para. 3.
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Table 7: Police - Measures Approved by the General Police Director
Legal Framework Law on the Police
Measure Targeted pursuit*
Approved by:
The President of the High Court of Cassation can, on recommendation by 
the General Police Director, authorises the application of special investiga-
tive activities defined by the Criminal Procedure Code in order to ensure 
the apprehension and arrest of persons suspected of serious criminal of-
fences or if an international arrest warrant is in force.
Duration: Six months. Can be extended by a further six months.
Reason for 
application: Combating crime
Application overseen 
by: High Court of Cassation
What happens to the 
information that is 
collected?
The High Court of Cassation, or rather an authorised judge, is required to 
destroy gathered information and to record its destruction.
Note: 
This measure is applied when the police is unable to apprehend and arrest 
the suspect through other means.
Data gathered through targeted pursuit cannot be used as evidence in 
criminal proceedings.
* The Law on Police, Art. 83.
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Criminal Procedure Code
Table 8: Criminal Procedure Code – Measures Authorised by Court
Measures:
Special investigative activities:*
•	 1) covert communications monitoring
•	 2) covert tailing and recording
•	 3) simulated business activity
•	 4) computer data search
•	 5) engagement of undercover agents
Other special measures for covert data collection
•	 6) surveillance of suspicious transactions (Article 145)
•	 7) acquiring records of telephone conversations, accessed databases and 
data on locations where communications have taken place (Article 286, Items 
3-5)
Approved by: The judge presiding over the case, on recommendation by the public prosecutor.
Applied by: The police, the Security-Information Agency, the Military Intelligence Agency,
Duration:
In the case of computer data searches, these measures can be applied by 
tax, customs and other services and authorities as well as legal entities so 
authorised.
Reason for 
application:
3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three 
times
Application 
overseen by:
State bodies applying these measures are required to keep daily reports on 
their application, which are then submitted to the presiding judge and the pub-
lic prosecutor on their request.
Upon conclusion of measures’ application, the relevant government body sub-
mits to the presiding judge recordings of communications, correspondence and 
other items along with a special report containing the following: the start and 
end date of the monitoring; details of the official who conducted the monitor-
ing; a description of technical equipment used; the data collected and an evalu-
ation of the operations applicability and its results.
What happens 
to the 
information that 
is collected?
Gathered data are used as evidence in criminal proceedings against the 
suspect.
In the event that criminal proceedings are not initiated by the public prosecutor 
within six months of becoming aware of the gathered data or if it is announced 
that the data will not be used in the proceedings, the judge presiding over pre-
liminary proceedings shall issue a decision on the destruction of the material.
In the event that the data were not gathered in accordance with regulations, 
they cannot be submitted as evidence, in other words, they cannot affect the 
judge’s deliberation. Unlawful evidence is struck from records, sealed and re-
tained by the judge presiding over preliminary proceedings until criminal pro-
ceedings are legally concluded, at which time it is destroyed and its destruction 
is recorded.
If proceedings are initiated on the basis of unlawfully gathered data, the unlaw-
ful data are retained until the criminal proceedings are legally concluded.
* Criminal Procedure Code, Art. 161.-187.
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Table 9: Criminal Procedure Code - Measures Authorised by the Public 
Prosecutor
Measure Controlled Delivery
Approved by:
The Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (or for War Crimes) can, in order 
to gather evidence on and detection of suspects, authorise an illegal or sus-
pect package to be delivered within Serbia or to enter, exit or traverse the 
country’s borders.
Duration: Until the package is delivered.
Reason for 
application: Combating crime
Application 
overseen by:
In conducting a controlled delivery the police submit a report to the public 
prosecutor containing: information on the start and end date of the delivery; 
details of the official conducting the operation; a description of technical 
equipment used; information on the persons affected and the results of the 
operation.
What happens to 
the information 
that is collected?
Collected material is not destroyed.
Note: Controlled delivery is conducted with the consent of affected countries, in accordance with ratified international treaties.
Measure Acquiring Data from Financial Institutions (Article 144)
Approved by:
The Public Prosecutor can order banks or other financial institutions to, 
within a given deadline, submit data on the accounts of a suspect, if they 
exist.
Duration:  – 
Reason for 
application: Combating crime
Application 
overseen by: The Public Prosecutor
What happens to 
the information 
that is collected?
The Public Prosecutor destroys the gathered data within six months of 
becoming aware of the data if criminal proceedings are not initiated, if the 
prosecutor will not request proceedings or if the data is not deemed neces-
sary for proceedings.
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The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering
The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (hereafter, the Adminis-
tration) is a financial intelligence service within the Ministry of Finance. It is tasked 
with tracking suspicious transactions and persons, on which it reports to the rele-
vant government department in cases of possible money laundering and the financ-
ing of terrorism.20 The Administration tracks suspicious transactions or persons and 
gathers data from the obligor, a term that denotes all actors within the financial and 
other sectors who conduct financial transactions (banks, registered exchange bu-
reaus, audit companies, etc.).21 In addition to the obligor, lawyers are also legally 
obliged to apply measures for the detection and prevention of money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism, in other words they must inform the Administration 
about suspicious persons and transactions.22 Obligors and lawyers are prohibited 
from alerting their clients to the fact that the Administration is accessing their data. 
In this sense, it can be concluded that the Administration applies covert data collec-
tion measures. As this is not, however, legally codified, external oversight over the 
implementation of these measures is limited.
The Administration applies two measures that can be characterised as special inves-
tigative measures.
20  Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Article 52
21  Obligors are defined by the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Article 4
22  Ibid. Article 5. Even after the December 2014 amendments, the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing 
Terrorism does not require public notaries to gather such data (Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 91/2010 from 03/12/2010)
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Table 10: Special Measures Applied by the Administration for the Prevention of 
Money Laundering
Legal 
foundation Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
Measure: 1) accessing data from obligors and lawyers
Approved by: The Director of the Administration
Duration: Not defined
Reason for 
application:
If the Administration assesses that there is reasonable suspicion of money launder-
ing or the financing of terrorism regarding certain transactions or persons
Application 
overseen by:
Prior to application: The relevant Administration officials and the Director
After application: Possible investigation by the Ministry of Finance inspectorate. The 
Administration submits an annual report to the Government
What happens 
to the informa-
tion that is 
collected?
The Administration analyses the gathered data, which can be submitted to other 
Serbian government bodies or, under legally defined conditions, to the government 
bodies responsible for preventing money laundering or the financing of terrorism 
from other countries.
Note:
Obligors are required by law to report to the Administration financial transactions 
amounting to 15,000 euros, as well as regarding every client or transaction they sus-
pect may involve money laundering or the financing of terrorism.* The Administra-
tion may also request data on transactions or persons that are deemed suspicious.
The Administration is required by law to request data not only on persons suspect-
ed of money laundering or the financing of terrorism but also on persons who are 
linked to them through business or financial transactions** Obligors and lawyers 
are required to store data or documentation on transactions or clients for at least 
ten years from the contact with the client or from the completed transaction.***
Measure: 2) tracking the financial operations of legal entities or persons****
Approved by: The Director of the Administration
Duration: 3 months from the issuing of a warrant
Reason for 
application:
If the Administration assesses that there is reasonable suspicion of money launder-
ing or the financing of terrorism regarding certain transactions or persons.
Application 
overseen by:
Prior to application: The relevant Administration officials and the Director
After application: Possible investigation by the Ministry of Finance inspectorate. The 
Administration submits an annual report to the Government.
What happens 
to the 
information 
that is 
collected?
The Administration analyses the gathered data, which can be submitted to other 
Serbian government bodies or, under legally defined conditions, to the government 
bodies responsible for preventing money laundering or the financing of terrorism 
from other countries.
Note: A tracking order can also cover persons who have had business dealings or financial transactions with the suspect. *****
* Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Article 9
** Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Article 53, Item 2
*** Ibid, Article 77, Item 1
**** Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism, Article 57.
***** Ibid, Article 57, Item 2. The Administration, however, does not have details indicating that it used these powers in the period 
2010 to 30/09/2014. (The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering. Response to BCSP questionnaire, 04/11/2014)
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What Private Investigators Can and Cannot Do
Private investigators (individuals or legal entities engaging in private investigations) 
are explicitly, legally prohibited from applying “operational methods and means and 
operational technical equipment, applied by the authorities on the basis of special 
regulations”. In practice, however, observing or proving that private investigators il-
legally gathered data is difficult. The Ministry of Interior should be required by law to 
investigate the activities of private agencies and to issue fines of 100,000 to 1,000,000 
dinars for the unauthorised application of operational methods and means. There 
are, however, suspicions that private investigators apply these methods (for exam-
ple, covert communications monitoring, i.e. wire-tapping) regardless of their legal 
prohibition.23
On the other hand, private investigators can gather and process personal data in 
accordance with regulations governing the protection of personal data and freedom 
of information. This means that private investigators can process data without the 
consent of the person whom the data regards, but only in accordance with the Law 
on Personal Data Protection.
WHAT DOES THE LAW ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION SAY ABOUT UNSO-
LICITED DATA PROCESSING?
Article 12**
Processing without consent shall be allowed in the following cases:
1) To achieve or protect vital interests of the data subject or a third party, in particular 
their life, health and physical integrity;
2) For the purpose of discharging duties laid down by a law, an enactment adopted 
pursuant to a law or a contract concluded between the person concerned and the 
controller, as well as for the purpose of contract preparation (processing data of a 
third person is unlawful);
2a) in order to raise funds for humanitarian purposes;
3) In other cases envisaged by this Law or another regulation adopted pursuant to this 
Law, for the purpose of achieving a prevailing justifiable interest of the person con-
cerned, the controller or a user.
23  Gedošević, L. “Sabić says Serbian citizens have been phone tapped by the State and private ‘services’” (Serbian „Šabić: Građane 
u Srbiji prisluškuju i državne i privatne ’službe’“), Blic Online, 02/05/2013: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Drustvo/380665/Sabic-Gradjane-
u-Srbiji-prisluskuju-i-drzavne-i-privatne-sluzbe
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The Law on Private Investigators outlines the types of data state bodies, legal enti-
ties and other database operators are required to hand over to private investigators. 
These are data on:
1. the person’s residence or domicile;
2. motor vehicle and boat ownership;
3. insurance policies;
4. real estate ownership;
5. pension and disability insurance;
6. data from court records in cases when the user is so authorised;
7. data from government archives.
In order to gain access to these data, investigators must submit a request to those in 
possession of the data (e.g. a government body), which contains the following:
1. the name and address of the legal entity or private investigation agency;
2. the type of data requested;
3. the start date for processing or accessing the data;
4. justification for accessing the data;
5. the legal basis for processing the data (the user’s legal authority);
6. the name and address of the user.
Those in possession of the data are required to refuse requests for data that are, ac-
cording to regulations on data classification, defined as classified.
OVERSIGHT OF THE 
APPLICATION OF SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES
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Judicial Review
Judicial review and oversight is carried out in accordance with two legislative re-
gimes governing the implementation of special investigative measures: the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code (CPC) or legislation specific to the relevant service (the Law on 
the Security-Information Agency and the Law on the Military Security Agency and 
the Military Intelligence Agency), when security services apply these measures in the 
course of their operations or preventatively. The form and scope of judicial review 
depends on which legislative regime the measures are applied under. Additionally, 
judicial review and oversight can be carried out in three phases: before the meas-
ures are applied; in the course of the measures’ application; and after the comple-
tion of the measures’ application. Review of measures implemented in accordance 
with the Criminal Procedure Code is, in that sense, comprehensive as it covers all 
three phases. On the other hand, review of measures applied in accordance with 
laws on the security services is almost wholly limited to the first phase (review prior 
to application).
THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
The Criminal Procedure Code provides for judicial review and oversight of special 
evidence gathering activities prior to their application (ex ante) and upon the com-
pletion of their application (post factum). Oversight of certain evidence gathering ac-
tivities can be conducted during their application. This level of review and oversight 
is not surprising, since evidence gathered unlawfully is inadmissible in court.
Ex Ante Review:
Ex ante review is carried out through approval of special evidence gathering activ-
ity. Most special evidence gathering procedures are determined by the judge presid-
ing over preliminary proceedings, on the request of the public prosecutor. A judi-
cial warrant must be justified and the CPC clearly prescribes what this justification 
must contain. On the other hand, controlled delivery is determined directly by public 
prosecutors.
Courts or prosecutors must also conduct ex ante review of the application of certain 
activities not recognised as special evidence gathering activity by the CPC but the 
application of which significantly infringes the right to privacy. On request by the 
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prosecutor, judges presiding over preliminary proceedings can, therefore, approve 
surveillance of suspect transactions and access to phone records, base stations used 
or locations from which communications were conducted. Prosecutors can approve 
access to data from banks and other financial institutions in accordance with Article 
144 of the CPC.
Table 11: Who authorises special investigative activities
Requested by the 
public prosecutor, 
approved by the 
judge presiding 
over preliminary 
proceedings*
•	 Covert communications monitoring (including further expansion, in 
accordance with Article 169); covert tailing and recording; simulated 
business activity; computer data searches; engagement of undercover 
agents
•	 Monitoring of suspicious transactions;
•	 Access to phone records, base stations used or locations from which 
communications were conducted
Determined by the 
public prosecutor
•	 Controlled delivery;
•	 Access to data from banks and other financial institutions in accord-
ance with Article 144 of the CPC
* Since 2013, the concept of prosecutorial investigation has been available in Serbia. So far, however, due to numerous problems, 
prosecutorial investigation has not taken off in practice (see: Karović, B. “Prosecutorial Investigation Delayed.” (Serbian: „Tužilač-
ka istraga zakočena”), Danas Today, http://goo.gl/KhDH21). This indicates that measures are de facto proposed by the police and 
security services, with prosecutors only passing these proposals to judges presiding over preliminary proceedings.
Review During Application:
The judge presiding over preliminary proceedings and the public prosecutor have 
the power to oversee implementation of some special evidence gathering activities 
during their application. This applies to the following measures: covert communica-
tions monitoring; covert tailing and recording and simulated business activity. Gov-
ernment agencies tasked with any of these activities are required to produce daily 
reports on their application. These daily reports, together with supporting materials 
defined by the CPC (for example, recordings made in the course of the operation) are 
submitted to the preliminary proceedings judge and the public prosecutor, however, 
the submission of these materials is not automatic and they must be requested. It is 
not known how frequently judges make use of this power.
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Table 12: The possibility of judicial review by phase of application
Measure Ex ante review Review during application*
Post festum 
review**
Covert communications monitoring Yes Yes Yes
Covert tailing and recording Yes Yes Yes
Simulated business activity Yes No Yes
Controlled delivery Prosecutor over-sight only No Yes
Engagement of undercover agents Yes No* Yes
Access to phone records, base sta-
tions used or locations from which 
communications were conducted
Yes No
(The police report to 
the public prosecu-
tor on applying this 
measure but do not 
report to the judge 
who approved the 
measure)
Access to data (from banks and 
other financial institutions)
 Exclusively by the 
prosecutor No No
Monitoring of suspicious 
transactions
Prosecutor over-
sight only No No
Nadzor sumnjivih transakcija Yes No No
* If the measure is reviewed by the same body that approved it.
** If the measure is reviewed by the same body that approved it.
Post Factum Review:
Upon concluding a special evidence gathering operation, the government agency 
tasked with its implementation, is required to report on the operation and any col-
lected materials (recordings, documents) to the judge presiding over preliminary 
proceedings. In the event of a controlled delivery, the report is submitted to the pub-
lic prosecutor. The contents of reports for each type of operation are clearly speci-
fied. As a rule, reports should include information on the when the operation was 
undertaken, details of who conducted it and the results of its application. For covert 
communication monitoring and covert tailing and recording the report must contain 
an assessment of whether applying these evidence gathering operations was appro-
priate. On the other hand, police engaging in operations to access phone records, 
base stations used or locations from which communications were conducted must 
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inform the public prosecutor but the CPC does not prescribe any requirement to re-
port to the judge presiding over preliminary proceedings who approved the applica-
tion of the measure.
Materials collected in special evidence gathering operations that will not be used in 
criminal proceedings is destroyed on the order of, and under the supervision of, the 
judge presiding over preliminary proceedings. The judge can (but isn’t required to) 
inform the person whose communications were subject to covert monitoring, pro-
vided this would not affect the likelihood of criminal proceedings being initiated. 
The same applies to data collected from banks and other financial institutions or to 
the tracking of suspicious transactions (all of which are destroyed on the decision of 
the public prosecutor). The entity that was subject to evidence gathering operations 
must be informed of this by the judge (in cases of the monitoring of suspicious trans-
actions) or the public prosecutor (in cases of the accessing of data). It must, however, 
be noted that in cases of covert tailing and recording and computer searches, the 
CPC does not envisage the possibility of persons ‘subject to measures’ being noti-
fied. Finally, when it comes to measures named in Article 286, the CPC prescribes 
that those subject to the measures can file a complaint with the judge presiding over 
preliminary proceedings. It is not, however, clear how the subject would even be-
come aware that they are subject to such measures.
Evidence gathered unlawfully through these special procedures is inadmissible in 
court and must be treated in the same way as other unlawful evidence: sealed and 
retained by the judge presiding over preliminary proceedings until the final comple-
tion of criminal proceedings, whereupon it must be destroyed and its destruction 
recorded.
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Table 13: Post factum review
Measure Covert communications monitoring
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to Preliminary proceedings judge
Report must contain
The start and end date of the monitoring; details of the officer 
who conducted the monitoring; a description of technical 
equipment used; the data collected and an evaluation of the 
operations applicability and its results.
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
It is possible, but not compulsory.
Measure Covert tailing and recording
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to Preliminary proceedings judge
Report must contain The same type of data as the report for covert communica-tions monitoring
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
Measure Simulated business activity
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to Preliminary proceedings judge
Report must contain
The date of simulated activity; details of the official involved 
(unless this was an undercover agent); a description of techni-
cal equipment used; details of those  included in the opera-
tion; all documentation on the operation, including visual, 
audio and electronic recordings and other evidence.
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
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Measure Computer data search
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to Preliminary proceedings judge
Report must contain
The start and end time of the search; data searched and 
processes; details on the official who conducted the search; 
a description of technical equipment used; details on those 
affected by the operation.
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
Measure Controlled delivery
Authorised by Public prosecutor
Report submitted to Public prosecutor
Report must contain
The start and end date of the delivery; details on the official 
who conducted the operation; a description of technical 
equipment used; details on those affected by the operation.
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence?
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
Measure Engagement of an undercover agent
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to Preliminary proceedings judge
Report must contain
The start and end date of the operation; the codename or alias 
of the agent; a description of techniques and equipment used; 
details on those affected by the operation; details of results 
achieved. Also included are photographs, visual, audio or elec-
tronic recordings, documentation and all other evidence.
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
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Measure Access to phone records, base stations used or locations from which communications were conducted
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to No report is required but the police must inform the public prosecutor.
Report must contain
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? No
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
It is not explicitly required but the CPC provides those subject 
to this measure the “can file a complaint with the judge presid-
ing over preliminary proceedings”
Measure Access to data from banks and other financial institutions
Authorised by Public prosecutor requests data directly from banks or other financial organisations.
Report submitted to
Report must contain
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
Yes
Measure Monitoring suspicious transactions
Authorised by Preliminary proceedings judge
Report submitted to No report is submitted.
Report must contain
Are materials destroyed if not 
used as evidence? Yes
Is the subject informed of the 
operation if the materials are not 
used as evidence?
No
LAWS ON THE SECURITY SERVICES
According to the laws on the security services (the Law on the Security-Information 
Agency and the Law on the Military Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency), 
judicial review of measures is performed primarily ex ante. Furthermore, the differ-
ent courts are responsible for measures that have the same fundamental purpose – 
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prevention of threats to the Republic of Serbia or those directed against the Ministry 
of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces.
Ex Ante Review
The Security-Information Agency: Special measures infringing on the privacy of 
correspondence and other communications were, until amendments to the Law on 
the BIA in June 2014, approved by the High Court of Cassation. After these amend-
ments the measures are approved by the President of the High Court in Belgrade, 
or rather a judge from the Special Department for Combating Organised Crime, as 
selected by the presiding judge. If the court turns down the request, the BIA Director 
can appeal the decision with the Appeals Court in Belgrade.
There are, however, two cases in which ex ante review of special measures is not 
possible.
Firstly, in addition to measures that infringe the privacy of correspondence, these are 
approved by the Agency’s Director rather the courts. This includes the following24:
 ■ Covert cooperation
 ■ Covert searches of premises and objects
 ■ Covert surveillance and monitoring
These measures are not mentioned not closely regulated by the Law on the BIA, they 
are regulated by secondary legislation on the BIA that is classified. As a result, there 
is no proper legal basis for external review of their application. That these measures 
are not explicitly regulated by law is all the mose surprising since their use infringes 
upon the right to privacy and given the fact that similar measures applied by the 
VBA (covert access of data records, cover surveillance and monitoring of persons in 
open and public spaces using technical equipment, covert recording and documen-
tation of conversations in external and internal spaced using technical equipment) 
are regulated by the Law on the VBA and VIA.
The second instance, is the attendant extension of measures already approved by 
the courts. Specifically, if in the course of an operation the BIA becomes aware that 
the person subject to a special measure is using a different means of communica-
24  Security-Information Agency, response to BCSP questionnaire, Belgrade, 17/12/2014
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tion, a different electronic or other address (or, for example, a different phone), the 
Director can order the measure to be extended. The Director of the BIA first orders 
the measure to be extended and only then, within 48 hours, requests court approval 
for the attendant extension. The court must then decide to approve the proposed 
extension within 48 hours of receiving the request, which means that it is possible for 
the BIA to apply measures that infringe on the privacy of correspondence and other 
communications, essentially without a court order. If the court rejects the request 
for attendant expansion of the measures, the data collected until that point must be 
destroyed in the presence of a judge. It is not, however, understood why the Direc-
tor is not required to seek immediate court approval for these extensions, especially 
when the law makes no mention of attendant extensions being undertaken in cases 
of extreme urgency.
The Military Security Agency: Special evidence gathering procedures and meas-
ures defined by the Law on the VBA and VOA are subject to three approval regimes. 
Individual procedures and measures are approved by the Director of the VBA. The 
application of covert electronic monitoring of telecommunications and information 
systems is approved by a high court form the appeals court in the region where the 
measures are applied. Meanwhile, covert recording of conversations, covert access 
to correspondence and covert surveillance and recording inside buildings is ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of Cassation.
In urgent cases, the Director of the VBA may order the application of special proce-
dures and measures that otherwise require court approval with the ‘consent’ of the 
relevant judge. Formal request for approval is submitted to the same judge within 24 
hours, however, it is not quite clear what constitutes ‘consent’ and how it is recorded.
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Table 14: Measures Authorised by Courts
Security Service: Measure Approved by Approval Period
BIA: Special measures that infringe on 
the privacy of correspondence and other 
communications
President of the High Court in Belgrade or 
a judge from the Special Department for 
Combating Organised Crime, as selected 
by the presiding judge
48 hours
VBA: covert electronic monitoring of tel-
ecommunications and information sys-
tems in order to access data on telecom-
munications traffic, without access to the 
content of communications
High court form the appeals court in the 
region where the measures are applied or 
where the activity took place, the detec-
tion, tracking and prevention of which 
is the responsibility of the VBA – ap-
proved by a judge selected by the Court 
President.
8 hours
VBA: covert recording of conversations in 
open spaces and inside buildings using 
technical equipment
Supreme Court of Cassation – approved 
by a judge selected by the President of 
the Supreme Court
24 hours
VBA: covert access to correspondence 
and other communications, including 
covert electronic surveillance of the con-
tent of communications and information 
systems
Supreme Court of Cassation – approved 
by a judge selected by the President of 
the Supreme Court
24 hours
Covert monitoring and recording inside 
buildings and closed spaces
Supreme Court of Cassation – approved 
by a judge selected by the President of 
the Supreme Court
24 hours
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Review during Application:
Judicial review during the application of measures in accordance with laws govern-
ing the security services is not prescribed. 
Table 15: Judicial review by phase of measures implementation
Service Measure Ex ante judicial review 
Post factum 
judicial review
Se
cu
rit
y-
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Ag
en
cy
1. Covert cooperation
2. Covert searches of premises and objects
3. Covert surveillance and monitoring
No No
Special measures that infringe on the privacy of cor-
respondence and other communications:
1. Covert monitoring and recording of communica-
tions regardless of the technical means used or 
monitoring electronic and other addresses;
2. covert monitoring and recording of communica-
tions in public places and places access is restrict-
ed or inside premises;
3. statistical electronic monitoring of communica-
tions and information systems with the aim of 
gathering data on communications or the use of 
mobile devices;
4. computer data searches of processed personal 
data and comparative analysis with data gathered 
using measures 1-3
Yes, except 
in cases of 
attendant 
expansion of 
the measure
No
M
ili
ta
ry
 S
ec
ur
ity
 A
ge
nc
y
1. Operational infiltration of organisations, groups or 
institutions
2. Covert acquisition of documents or objects
3. Covert access to databases, in accordance with 
the law
4. Covert tailing and monitoring of persons in 
open spaces and public places using technical 
equipment
No No
1. Covert electronic monitoring of telecommunica-
tions and information systems in order to access 
data on telecommunications traffic, without ac-
cess to the content of communications
2. Covert monitoring and recording inside buildings, 
closed spaces and premises
Yes
Yes
(The relevant 
judge is in-
formed that 
the measure’s 
application 
has been 
concluded)
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Post Factum Review
Security-Information Agency: Judicial review after the application of special meas-
ures infringing on the privacy of correspondence and other communications is not 
prescribed by law. In other words, the BIA is not required to report the judge who 
approved the measures on their conclusion or to submit a final report.
The only situation in which post factum review is exercised is the preventative ap-
plication of special measures which provides evidence of a criminal offence. In such 
cases, the resultant materials are submitted to the relevant Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice and are handled in accordance with the CPC.
The Military Security Agency is, upon the completion of an operation for which it 
required judicial approval, obliged to inform the judge of the conclusion of the op-
eration. This does not, however, have to include a report on the applied measures. As 
such, the judge who approved the measures can record the duration of the operation 
but cannot confirm that information pertaining to those persons who were subject 
to the measure matches information from the approval request, or any other results 
of the measure’s application.
As with the BIA, the VBA is required to inform the relevant Public Prosecutor’s Office 
in cases when information gathered during the application of special investigative 
measures points to the preparation or execution of a crime. This does not, however, 
have to include information on the applied measures that led to this knowledge and 
does not, therefore, contribute to the possibility of post factum review.
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The National Assembly
Oversight exercised by the National Assembly is always post factum oversight, i.e. 
after the event. The law, moreover, expressly prohibits deputies requesting informa-
tion from the security services pertaining to ongoing operations.
The National Assembly monitors implementation of special measures primarily 
through the relevant committees.
The Security Services Control Committee oversees the work of the Security-Informa-
tion Agency, the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency. The 
Committee is explicitly authorised to oversee the legality of the application of spe-
cial procedures and measures for covert data collection.25 In addition, the Commit-
tee monitors the services’ political, ideological and interest neutrality, the legality of 
their expenditure of budgetary and other resources and investigates illegal or unlaw-
ful practices and adopts conclusions thereon. These powers are also significant in 
overseeing the application of special investigative measures.
In order to exercise oversight, the Committee has several instruments at its disposal.
The Directors of the services are required to submit regular reports to the Commit-
tee, at least once per parliamentary session. This is an opportunity for the Commit-
tee members to request comprehensive statistical data on the application of special 
measures.
Oversight of the legality of budgetary and other expenditure, for example, grants Committee 
members the right to review the legality of funds spent on covert use of property and services 
provided, for a fee, by individuals and businesses.
In addition to regular reports, the Committee can request that the Directors submit 
an unscheduled report. These reports are a useful tool for the clarification of certain 
issues and, potentially, ongoing scandals, regarding the implementation of special 
investigative measures.
25  Law on Bases of Security Service Organization, Article 16, Item 2, Point 3
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The breadth of oversight does not depend only on the legal powers of deputies but also on 
the way security services are structured and their internal practices when it comes to record-
ing the use of special measures. For example, the VBA is not required by law to keep records 
on special data collection procedures and measures, if these have been court approved. In 
practice, the VBA does not keep records on the total number of annual requests made for the 
application of special procedures and measures, nor the number of special procedures and 
measures actually applied.*
__
* Military Security Agency, response to BCSP questionnaire, Belgrade, 05/01/2015
The Security Services Control Committee also exercises indirect oversight through 
oversight inspections. Members of the Committee have the right to visit the offices 
of the service, gain access to documentation and ask for information on the service’s 
activities. Furthermore, the law explicitly lists the types of data National Assembly 
deputies cannot access26, this includes information on:
 ■ The identity of current and former operatives;
 ■ The service’s operatives working undercover;
 ■ Third persons who could be endangered by their identity becoming known;
 ■ Methods on obtaining intelligence and security-related data;
 ■ Ongoing operations;
 ■ Data and intelligence acquired through cooperation with foreign services and in-
ternational organisations;
 ■ Classified information and information from other state bodies held by the 
service.
This means that Committee members have the right to access information relating 
to any other aspect of the service’s activities, including information classified as se-
cret to some degree.
26  Law on Bases of Security Service Organization, Article 19, Item 2
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The Inspector General of the military services monitors whether special procedures and 
measures for covert data collection are applied lawfully by the VBA and VOA.
The Inspector General is a body that combines the characteristics of internal and external 
oversight: constituted by the Government for a period of five years, it is responsible to the 
Minister of Defence, but it reports to the Security Services Control Committee on the imple-
mented oversight.
In overseeing the activities of the VBA and the VOA, the Committee has legally estab-
lished cooperation with the Inspector General of the military services, which submits 
at least one annual oversight report to the Committee. 
The manner in which these oversight inspections are conducted is regulated by a Decision 
passed by the Security Services Control Committee during the 2012-2014 parliamentary 
session and re-adopted by the Committee in its current session (2014-). The Decision does 
not constitute a legal document, however, as neither the Law on the National Assembly 
nor the Rules of Procedure grant committees with the power to pass internal regulations. 
As a result, the Decision is not binding for committees in future convocation – each must 
decide to once again adopt the Decision or to regulate oversight inspections in a different 
manner or not to regulate them at all.
The Decision, which is currently in force, does not prescribe a method (or methods) for 
selection of the subject the deputies will review in the field. In practice, this reduces the 
predictability and effectiveness of these oversight inspections.
It is worth mentioning that the heads of the internal affairs departments at the VBA 
and the VOA must notify the Inspector General and, if necessary, the relevant Na-
tional Assembly committee, in the event that the director of the service fails to rectify 
illegalities or irregularities their department has previously identified.
The Security Services Control Committee is required to take into consideration peti-
tions regarding the security services and from ordinary members of the public and 
to propose measures to address issues highlighted. This allows the Committee to 
detect any irregularities in the implementation of special investigative measures, 
which could lead to it requesting an unscheduled report from the service director or, 
if appropriate, organising an oversight inspection.
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The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee exercises oversight of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the General Police Directorate. Unlike the Security Services Con-
trol Committee, this committee does not have any explicit powers to exercise over-
sight of the use of special measures by the police or, more specifically, the Criminal 
Force Directorate. The Committee does, however, have the power to deliberate on 
all issues pertaining to internal affairs, which certainly includes the application of 
special measures.
As the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee does not have explicit powers to ex-
ercise oversight of the implementation of special measures so the instruments at 
its disposal for this are quite limited. Nevertheless, by putting what instruments are 
available to them to good use, the committee members can still come by significant 
information.
The Ministry of Interior submits regular reports on its activities and the state of se-
curity. In practice, these reports have so far referred only to the security situation 
in Serbia and have not offered detailed information on the work of the Ministry or 
police methods. Even so, the Committee could use deliberation of the regular re-
ports as an opportunity to request information on the number of evidence gathering 
operations and targeted searches implemented.
The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee can also request that the Minister of In-
terior submit unscheduled reports on “issues pertaining to their jurisdiction”.
The Security Services Control Committee and the Defence and Internal Affairs Com-
mittee can also improve oversight of the application of special measures by estab-
lishing regular cooperation with independent regulatory bodies, the Ombudsman 
and the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data 
Protection. 
The Committees, according to the National Assembly Rules of Procedure, can also 
engage experts in order to more closely examine issues within the jurisdiction of the 
National Assembly. The engagement of experts in law, technology and security could 
afford deputies greater insight into the application of special measures. For exam-
ple, telecommunications experts could aid deputies by indicating what they should 
pay closer attention to when it comes to covert communications monitoring.
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National Assembly deputies who are not members of either of the aforemen-
tioned committees can pose parliamentary questions on the application of special 
measures. They cannot gain insight into information that is classified (a right re-
served for those who are members of oversight committees and the National Assem-
bly Speaker) but they can request aggregated data on the application of measures or 
information on the number of training sessions members of the security services and 
police have attended on the application of measures.
In the event that there is a need to resolve a scandal or perceived systematic de-
ficiency in the application of special measures, the National Assembly can estab-
lish temporary working bodies: an inquiry committee or an inquiry commission. An 
inquiry committee is made up of National Assembly deputies and an inquiry com-
mission is made up of deputies, representatives of government bodies and organi-
sations, scientists and experts. Both working bodies have the task of analysing the 
situation in a given area or establishing the facts about certain issues or events.
An inquiry committee or commission cannot execute investigative or other judicial 
activities.
An inquiry committee or commission has the right to request data, documents and in-
formation from government bodies and organisations, and can also take statements by 
individuals if necessary.
Representatives of government bodies and organisations are required to respond to a 
summons by an inquiry committee or commission and to provide truthful statements, in-
formation or documents.
Inquiry committees and commissions report, with recommendations, to the National 
Assembly.
The Rules on Procedure does not, however, prescribe, how an inquiry committee/com-
mission is formed nor who can initiate its formation (how many deputies, parliamentary 
groups, etc.)
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Independent Regulatory Bodies
Independent regulatory bodies that, within their capacity, oversee the implementa-
tion of special measures are the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Information 
of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection.
The Ombudsman reviews the activities of government bodies in order to protect 
and promote human rights. Oversight procedure is initiated by a complaint filed by 
a member of the public or on the institution’s own initiative. During the review pro-
cess the Ombusdman has the right to access the offices of the government body – in-
cluding offices of the security services – and to gather all data relevant to the review, 
including data classified at the highest level of secrecy (“state secret”).27 Using its 
far-reaching powers, the Ombudsman’s office is the only regulatory body that 
can review special measures during their application. In order to secure these 
powers the Ombudsman is required to pass rigorous security checks so as to ac-
cess data classified at the highest level of secrecy (“top secret”)28.
In 2010, the Ombudsman conducted a preventative review of the Security-Information 
Agency.* The review included:
3. A preliminary meeting
4. A special meeting between the Ombudsman and the BIA Director
5. Review meetings
6. A clarification meeting
7. Production and presentation of a report and recommendations
8. BIA reaction to the recommendations and report on the results.
Also, during 2014, the Ombudsman conducted a review of the BIA regarding covert prem-
ises searches.** This represented a unique opportunity to review one of the special meas-
ures regulated exclusively by internal BIA regulations and is, therefore, not subject to judi-
cial review or parliamentary oversight.
__
* Zaštitnik građana. „Izveštaj o preventivnoj kontrolnoj poseti Zaštitnika građana Bezbednosno-informativnoj agenciji.” Del.br. 
2016. Beograd, 16.10.2010.5.
** Ombudsman. Report on Review of Security-Information Agency Preparations for Covert Surveillance Measures, No. 25507, 
Belgrade, 03/09/204
27  Law on the Ombudsman, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 79/2005 and 54/2007, Article 21
28  Data Protection Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 104/2009, Article 38, Item 2 and Article 53 
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In the event that a review turns up shortcomings in the work of a government body, 
the Ombudsman will make recommendations on how the shortcomings can be re-
solved. The government body shall, no later than 60 days after receiving the recom-
mendations, inform the Ombudsman on whether it has complied with the recom-
mendations and resolved the shortcomings or in order to present the reasons for not 
complying with the recommendations.
The Commissioner has not, to date, conducted direct oversight of the application of spe-
cial measures by the police, security services and the Administration for the Prevention 
of Money Laundering. The Commissioner has, however, twice conducted oversight of tel-
ecommunications operators that shed light on the activity of covert telecommunications 
surveillance: In 2011-2012 oversight was conducted of access to data stored by telephone 
operators, while in 2014 the subject of oversight were internet providers. The Commis-
sioner’s findings reveal weaknesses in the regulations, procedures and capabilities of the 
operators that lead to a risk of abuse in the application of covert telecommunications 
monitoring and computer data searches.
The Commissioned for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protec-
tion (hereafter: the Commissioner) monitors implementation of the Law on Personal 
Data Protection and highlights violations resulting from data collection. Since the 
application of special investigative measures results in the collection of personal 
data, this aspect of the work of security institutions is subject to oversight by the 
Commissioner.
The Commissioner may initiate oversight based on information that has come to 
their attention ex officio, as the result of a complaint filed by a third party. Oversight 
is conducted by authorised personnel, i.e. inspectors.
On the basis of results obtained in the course of oversight, the Commissioner may:
 ■ Order the holder of the data to resolve irregularities within a given deadline;
 ■ Temporarily prohibit the processing of data that is in contravention of the Law on 
Personal Data Protection;
 ■ Order the unlawfully collected data to be deleted.29
29  Law on Personal Data Protection, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 97/2008, 104/2009 – Nat. Law, 68/2012 – Con-
stitutional Court Decision and 107/2012, Article 56, Item 2
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From 2014, the police, the BIA and the VBA have been required to report annually (by 
31 January for the previous calendar year)30 to the Commissioner on the number of re-
quests for access to stored electronic data31 they submitted to telephone and internet 
operators.32 Operators are also required to submit, to the Commissioner, their own re-
cords on the number of received requests. This enables cross-referencing of access to 
stored data, a form of sensitive personal data. This does not, however, establish com-
prehensive supervision of access to stored data as the police, the BIA and the VBA are 
able to access data without submitting a request to the operator.
30  Which means that the police, the BIA and the VBA first submitted reports to the Commissioner on January 2015 for the 2014 
calendar year.
31  Stored data are data on communications which do not reveal the content of the communications but do reveal the type of 
communication, the location from which it was conducted, the time the communication was conducted and who communicated 
with whom.
32  Law on Electronic Communications, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 44/2010, 60/2013 – Constitutional Court 
Decision and 62/2014, Article 130a.
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WHO CAN MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC TURN TO IF THEY BELIEVE THEIR RIGHTS 
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY THE APPLICATION OF SPECIAL MEASURES?
The first points of contact are the internal affairs departments. Members of the public can, 
on this level, only file complaints pertaining to the work of the police as, in the case of the 
BIA and the VBA, this opportunity is not explicitly legally regulated. The Law on the Police 
prescribes that the Internal Affairs Sector act, among other things, “on the basis of sug-
gestions, reports and complaints filed by individuals and legal entities”*, and guarantees 
everyone the right to “file a complaint with the Ministry against any police official if they 
believe that the unlawful or improper actions of the official have violated their rights or 
freedoms”**. Complaints are filed with the Ministry or one of its departments in the rel-
evant municipality in verbal, written or electronic form.*** On the other hand, the Law on 
the VBA and the VOA explicitly directs members of the public to the Inspector General of 
the military security services if they feel that the activities of these services have violated 
their human rights and freedoms.****
When it comes to independent watchdogs, members of the public can turn to the Om-
budsman, which receives complaints about any government body. The National Assem-
bly’s Security Services Control Committee (BIA, VOA, and VBA) is empowered to “take 
into consideration suggestions, petitions and complaints pertaining to the security ser-
vices and addressed by members of the public to the National Assembly and to propose 
measures for their resolution and to inform the complainant on the outcome”.*****
__
* Law on the Police, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 101/2005, 63/2009 – Constitutional Court Decision and 
92/2011, Article 174, Item 1
** Ibid. Article 180.
*** Rules of Procedure on Dealing with Complaints, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 54/2006, Article 3
**** Law on the VBA and VOA, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 88/2009, 55/2012 – Constitutional Court Decision 
and 17/2013, Article 61
***** Article 16 of the Law on Bases of Security Service Organization, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos.116/2007 and 
72/2012. Same in National Assembly Rules of Procedure, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 52/10, Article 66
QUESTIONS FOR 
OVERSIGHT ON 
SPECIAL MEASURES
63
65
Questions that should be asked during the oversight process: 
Security-Information Agency and Military Security Agency
REQUEST REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
APPLYING MEASURES
Suggested question:
Please provide a copy of documents regulating (1) responsibilities, (2) obliga-
tions, (3) accountability and (4) review of all activities undertaken by the Crimi-
nal Force Directorate, the Internal Affairs Sector and the Office of the Minis-
ter of Interior.
Responses to this question could yield information on how each specific department 
within the MoI applies special covert data collection measures and whether this area is 
even regulated, especially with regards to review and the prevention of misuse.
Suggested question:
Please provide a copy of documents regulating procedures for the storage of 
materials gathered in the application of special measures under the legal re-
gime of the Criminal Procedure Code and the submission of said materials to 
the judge presiding over preliminary proceedings.
The Criminal Procedure Code does not explicitly prohibit government bodies that ap-
ply special measures from storing data and copies of materials acquired during the 
application of special evidence gathering activity. The courts have no way of checking 
that all materials have been submitted, nor whether government agencies have re-
tained copies of, for example, visual or audio recordings, made in the course of special 
investigative activities, resulting in a risk of misuse. Furthermore, careless handling of 
materials submitted to courts leaves room for potential ‘leaks’.
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REQUEST STATISTICAL DATA
Suggested question:
How many times have units of the Ministry of Interior, authorised to apply spe-
cial cover data collection measures according to provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code and the Law on the Police, applied these measures in previous 
years?
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure 2013 2014 2015
Monitoring of suspicious transactions
Covert communications monitoring
Simulated business activity
Computer data searches
Controlled delivery
Engagement of undercover agent
Access to phone records, base stations used or locations 
from which communications were conducted
Police observation 
Targeted search
mere ciljanje potrage
1. To what extent the principle of proportionality is respected – that is, that informa-
tion on a criminal offence cannot have been uncovered in another way that does 
not infringe on human rights – in the application of measures for covert data collec-
tion, especially in comparison with the application of ‘ordinary’ evidence gathering.
2. Whether the police keep regular annual records of special measures applied.
3. Which special measures are not made use of? For example, research by BCSP has 
shown that the special evidence gathering through engagement of undercover 
agent has not been approved once during the October 2013 to October 2014 period 
in the regions covered by 11 high courts. This begs the question, why is this meas-
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ure not in use? Does the MoI department for undercover agents have sufficient hu-
man and material resources? Do police officials receive sufficient training in the 
engagement of undercover agents? Can the MoI protect undercover agents during 
and after their operations?
CHECK THE DURATION OF APPLIED MEASURES
Suggested question:
How long does the application of measures for covert data collection, accord-
ing to provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on the Police and 
the Law on Electronic Communications, last on average in accordance with 
standard police practice?
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure Duration Legal restriction
Monitoring of suspicious transactions Three months, with possibility to be extended three times by a further three months.
Covert communications monitoring 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Covert tailing and recording 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Simulated business activity 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Computer data search 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Controlled delivery Until the package is delivered
Engagement of undercover agent 3 months, which can be extended by a further 3 months a maximum of three times
Access to phone records, base sta-
tions used and locations from which 
communications were conducted
3 months, which can be extended by a further 
3 months a maximum of three times
Police observation Unlimited
Targeted search Six months, which can be extended by further six months
Based on responses to this question you can check and confirm whether legal con-
straints on the application of special covert data collection measures are observed, as 
well as whether the application of special measures is effective – if they are always ap-
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plied for the maximum permitted duration this is likely not a good sign either for police 
effectiveness nor for human rights.
LOOK INTO THE WORK OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS SECTOR
Suggested question:
How many times has the Police Internal Affairs Sector pressed for criminal 
charges or proposed disciplinary proceedings against police officers for 
misuse of data obtained through the application of measures for covert data 
collection?
Based on responses you can check and confirm what the Internal Affairs Sector does 
to prevent and investigate, for example, ‘information leaks’ from the police and the 
data collected in the application of covert data collection measures. To follow up you 
can check whether sanctions for misuse are prescribed as, according to the Law on the 
Police, the disclosure to unauthorised persons of confidential information as defined by 
law and other regulations is a serious breach of official duty.
LEARN WHAT PROBLEMS EXIST
Suggested question:
What special data collection measures can the police apply independently, 
without resorting to use of BIA technical capabilities?
What training courses on the application of special covert data collection 
measures do police officers attend? Who runs these training courses?
Based on responses to these questions you can discover which technical, material and 
human resource problems the police face in applying special covert data collection 
measures. Responses to the first question can form the basis for further investigation 
of why the police rely in BIA resources. This is not in line with best practices established 
by EU member states. From responses to the second question you can learn how deter-
mined the MoI is to improve its employees’ ability to apply special measures in accord-
ance with principles of human rights. 
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Suggested question:
How many requests for access to stored data have been sent to telecommunica-
tions operators over the past year? How many times have stored data been ac-
cessed, with or without the consent of the operators?
The police are able to access data on members of the public at any time, they do not 
need operator approval. Operators have the technical ability to register every time 
stored on their users data are accessed but are required by law to keep records only of 
the number of requests they have received. The police are also required to keep records 
only on the number of requests submitted and to report these records to the Commis-
sioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, on an an-
nual basis. This means that access to stored data gained without a formal request is 
currently an external oversight ‘blind spot’.
Suggested question:
Could you please specify all types of stored data the police have gained access 
to. Are websites the user has visited included in these data?
The types of data stored are defined by the Law on Electronic Communication.33 Nev-
ertheless, the way they are defined is much more appropriate for telephone rather 
than internet traffic. Further regulation on stored data should come from a rulebook 
on technical requirements for lawful interception of electronic communications and 
access to stored data, which the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 
has yet to adopt. Website views are a particularly problematic type of data because, 
although at first glance they appear to be stored data, they actually reveal the content 
of communications.
33  Law on Electronic Communications, Article 129
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Questions that should be asked during the oversight process: 
Security-Information Agency and Military Security Agency
REQUEST REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
APPLYING MEASURES
Suggested question:
Please could you provide the regulation that governs the application of cov-
ert data collection measures approved by the Director of the Agency?
The Security-Information Agency: Research by BCSP shows that the BIA applies three 
special measures on the basis of a classified internal regulation. The measures are cov-
ert searches of premises and objects, covert cooperation and covert surveillance and 
monitoring. It is important, therefore, to learn how the application of these measures 
is regulated and whether their use is determined by the principle of proportionality. At 
any event, as long as the measures are governed only by secret internal regulations 
there is no predictability; i.e. the public do not know under what circumstances they 
may be subject to covert searches nor in which kinds of premises these searches can be 
applied. This is why it is important, in the long run, that the application of covert data 
collection measures be specifically governed by law.
The Military Security Agency: The application of special procedures and measures for 
covert data collection should, according to the law, be closely regulated by the Minis-
ter of Defence, on proposal by the Director of the VBA and with the involvement of the 
National Security Council. The Minister of Defence also regulates the means and condi-
tions for determining fees for covert cooperation with persons or legal entities.34
Suggested question:
Please could you provide a copy of the document that regulates procedures 
for the storage and submission to the preliminary proceedings judge of data 
acquired in the application of special measures, according to provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code.
34  Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency, Article 22
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The Criminal Procedure Code does not explicitly prohibit the government bodies that 
apply evidence gathering measures from storing data and copies of materials acquired 
in the application of said measures. Courts do not have any way of checking whether 
they are in receipt of all materials or whether the government agencies have retained 
copies, for example, of visual or audio recordings made in the course of special investi-
gative activities, resulting in a risk of misuse. Furthermore, careless handling of materi-
als submitted to courts leaves room for potential ‘leaks’.
REQUEST STATISTICAL DATA
Suggested question:
How many times, in previous years, has the Agency35 been authorised to apply 
covert data collection measures according to provisions of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code?
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure 2013 2014 2015
Monitoring of suspicious transactions
Covert communications monitoring
Covert tailing and recording
Simulated business activity
Computer data searches
Controlled delivery
Engagement of undercover agent
Access to phone records, base stations used or locations from 
which communications were conducted
35  BIA or VBA
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For the BIA
Could you please specify the number of requests, for the application of spe-
cial measures that violate the right to private correspondence and other com-
munications, the Director of the Agency has submitted to the courts over the 
past year? How many requests were rejected? What reasons were given for the 
rejection of requests?
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure
Total number 
of requests 
submitted 
to the courts 
during ____ 
(year)
Number of 
approved 
requests
Number of 
rejected 
requests
Covert surveillance and recording of 
communications regardless of the tech-
nical means used or monitoring of elec-
tronic or other addresses
Covert surveillance and recording of 
communications in public places and 
places where access is restricted or in-
side premises 
Statistical electronic monitoring of com-
munications and information systems 
with the aim of gathering data on the 
communication or the location in which 
a mobile device was used
Computer data searches of already pro-
cesses personal and other data
How many times, in previous years, has the Director of the Agency or a person 
authorised by the Director issued a warrant for the application of the follow-
ing measures:
 ■ Covert search or premises and objects
 ■ Covert cooperation
 ■ Covert surveillance and monitoring?
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For the VBA
Please could you specify the number of requests for the application of spe-
cial data collection procedures and measures the Director of the Agency has 
submitted to the courts over the past year? How many requests were rejected? 
What reasons were given for the rejection of requests?
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure
Total number 
of requests 
submitted to the 
courts during 
____ (year)
Number of 
approved 
requests
Number of 
rejected 
requests
Statistical electronic monitoring of communica-
tions and information systems with the aim of 
gathering data on communications traffic with-
out accessing the content of communications
Covert recording and documentation of conver-
sations in open or closed spaces using technical 
equipment
Covert monitoring of the content of corre-
spondence and other communications, includ-
ing covert electronic monitoring of the content 
of communications and information systems
Covert monitoring and recording within prem-
ises, closed spaces and objects
How many times, in previous years, has the Director of the Agency or a person 
authorised by the Director issued a warrant for the application of the follow-
ing measures:
1. Operational infiltration of organisations, groups and institutions;
2. Covert acquisition of documents and objects;
3. Covert access of records, in accordance with the law;
4. Covert tailing and monitoring of persons in open spaces, public places with use 
of technical equipment;
5. Covert use of services provided by persons or business for a fee.
Based on responses to these questions, you can learn:
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1. How frequently the BIA/VBA propose the use of special measures. This enables the 
tracking of trends from year to year and forms a basis for the formulation of fur-
ther questions on whether measures are applied appropriately. The Law on the BIA 
requires that decisions on the application of measures take into account whether 
the same results could be achieved by means less restrictive to the rights of the 
public36. This is an important question that should be taken into consideration as a 
matter of course when reviewing the application of special measures.
2. How frequently courts reject requests for the application of measures and why.
3. Whether and how thoroughly the security services keep records on the proposal 
and application of special measures.
4. What the relationship is between operations and the use of covert communications 
monitoring, which has a greater impact on the privacy of members of the public? Is 
covert communications monitoring used as a substitute for operations and how is 
this justified?
Suggested question:
How long does the application of measures for covert data collection, accord-
ing to provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Laws on the BIA/VBA/
VOA, last on average? 
Suggested table for recording responses:
Measure Duration Legal restriction
Criminal Procedure Code
Monitoring of suspicious 
transactions
Three months, with possibility to be ex-
tended three times by a further three 
months.
Covert communications 
monitoring
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Covert tailing and recording 3 months, which can be extended by a fur-ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Simulated business activity 3 months, which can be extended by a fur-ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Computer data search 3 months, which can be extended by a fur-ther 3 months a maximum of three times
36  Law on the Security-Information Agency, Article 14
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Controlled delivery Until the package is delivered
Engagement of undercover agent 3 months, which can be extended by a fur-ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Access to phone records, base 
stations used and locations from 
which communications were 
conducted
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Law on the Security-Information Agency
Covert surveillance and recording 
of communications regardless 
of the technical means used or 
monitoring of electronic or other 
addresses
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Covert surveillance and record-
ing of communications in public 
places and places where access is 
restricted or inside premises
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Statistical electronic monitoring 
of communications and informa-
tion systems with the aim of gath-
ering data on the communication 
or the location in which a mobile 
device was used
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Computer data searches of al-
ready processes personal and 
other data
3 months, which can be extended by a fur-
ther 3 months a maximum of three times
Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency
Statistical electronic monitoring 
of communications and infor-
mation systems with the aim of 
gathering data on communica-
tions traffic without accessing the 
content of communications
Six months, which can be extended by fur-
ther six months
Covert recording and documen-
tation of conversations in open 
or closed spaces using technical 
equipment
Six months, which can be extended by fur-
ther six months
Covert monitoring of the content 
of correspondence and other 
communications, including cov-
ert electronic monitoring of the 
content of communications and 
information systems
Six months, which can be extended by fur-
ther six months
Covert monitoring and recording 
within premises, closed spaces 
and objects
Six months, which can be extended by fur-
ther six months
Based on responses to these questions you can check and confirm whether legal re-
strictions on the duration of covert data collection measures are respected, as well as 
how effective the measures are – if they are always applied for the maximum permitted 
duration this is likely not a good sign either for the service’s effectiveness nor for human 
rights.
CHECK WHAT THE SECURITY SERVICE’S PRIORITIES ARE IN APPLYING 
MEASURES.
Suggested question:
Please name the five criminal offences for the investigation of which the Agen-
cy has most frequently applied covert data collection measures (special inves-
tigative activity) over the past year.
Based on responses to this question you can learn what the greatest security threats 
are in Serbia and compare them with external analysis of challenges, risks and threats. 
The responses will also indicate the priority areas for the Agencies. This can form the 
basis of additional questions on the justifiability of the Agencies dealing with these 
threats.
For the BIA: For the previous year, what percentage of measures were applied 
according to the Criminal Procedure Code and what percentage were applied 
according to the Law on the BIA?
For the VBA: For the previous year, what percentage of measures were applied 
according to the Criminal Procedure Code and what percentage were applied 
according to the Law on the VBA and VOA?
Based on responses to these questions you can learn how frequently the BIA/VBA ap-
ply special measures preventatively (to thwart threats to the security of Serbia, the 
Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces) and how often these measures are 
applied as part of criminal investigations. This relationship may indicate which activi-
ties the security services prioritise. Tracking this relationship from year to year should 
indicate how the priorities of the security services have changed and beg the question 
of why they have changed.
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CHECK TO WHAT EXTENT THE REVIEWED SECURITY SERVICE IS CAPABLE 
OF INTERNALLY DETECTING AND RESOLVING ABUSES.
Suggested question:
How many times has the Internal Affairs Department brought criminal charges 
or disciplinary action against members of the Agency regarding abuse of pow-
ers in applying measures for covert data collection?
Based on responses to this question it is possible to assess the capability of the reviewed 
service to internally resolve problems relating to abuse of powers. Responses may also 
lead to additional questions about the capacities of internal affairs departments and 
their position within the services.
LEARN WHAT PROBLEMS EXIST
Suggested question:
What training do operatives of the Agency receive on the application of special 
covert data collection measures? What does the training focus on?
Training received by members of the security services on special measures does not 
necessarily guarantee that they know how to apply these measures lawfully and with-
out unduly infringing on the rights of members of the public. The Ombudsman’s 2014 
report on a review of the BIA’s application of covert surveillance measures highlighted 
the need to train personnel so as to prevent unlawful infringement, through ignorance 
or carelessness, of people’s rights37.
Suggested question:
How many requests for access to stored data have been submitted to telecom-
munications operators over the past year? How many times have stored data 
been accesses successfully, with or without submission of a request to the 
operators?
37  Ombudsman, Review of the Security-Information Agency’s Application of Covert Surveillance Measures. No. 614-506/14. Belgra-
de, 03/09/2014: p. 5
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The BIA and VBA are able to access data on members of the public at any time, they do 
not need operator approval. Operators have the technical ability to register every time 
stored on their users data are accessed but are required by law to keep records only of 
the number of requests they have received. The police are also required to keep records 
only on the number of requests submitted and to report these records to the Commis-
sioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, on an an-
nual basis. This means that access to stored data gained without a formal request is 
currently an external oversight ‘blind spot’.
Suggested question:
Could you please specify all types of stored data the Agency has accessed. Are 
websites the user has visited included in these data?
The types of data stored are defined by the Law on Electronic Communication. Nev-
ertheless, the way they are defined is much more appropriate for telephone rather 
than internet traffic. Further regulation on stored data should come from a rulebook 
on technical requirements for lawful interception of electronic communications and 
access to stored data, which the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications 
has yet to adopt. Website views are a particularly problematic type of data because, 
although at first glance they appear to be stored data, they actually reveal the content 
of communications.
Questions for the high courts38
How many times during ____ (year) have judges presiding over preliminary pro-
ceedings rejected requests for the application of special investigative activity 
and other covert data collection measures prescribed by the Criminal Proce-
dure Code?
What are the most common ground, based on Serbian jurisprudence, for the re-
jection by a preliminary proceedings judge of a request to apply special inves-
tigative activity and other covert data collection measures prescribed by the 
Criminal Procedure Code?
From responses to these questions it will be possible to learn which irregularities typi-
cally arise in the application of special measures and how frequent they are.
How many times during ____ (year) have judges presiding over preliminary pro-
ceedings approved requests by public prosecutors to destroy material col-
lected through special investigative activity and other covert data collection 
measures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code?
What are the common grounds on which a preliminary proceedings judge issues 
a decision on the destruction of collected materials?
From responses to these questions it will be possible to learn how frequently applied 
measures do not achieve their desired aims (gathering evidence) and why this is the 
case.
How much and what kind of training have judges received to date regarding 
the approval of special investigative activity and other covert data collection 
measures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code?
Well trained judges are indispensible for the lawful approval of special investigative 
activity and other covert data collection measures prescribed by the Criminal Proce-
dure Code.
38  Questions that should be posed by civil society organisations, in other words, the interested public. Parliamentary oversight 
focuses on the executive authority: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the security services.
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Questions for the higher public prosecutor’s offices39
How many times during ____ (year) have courts dismissed evidence submitted by 
the prosecutor’s office due to it being gathered unlawfully through special 
investigative activity and covert data collection measures.
From responses to these questions it will be possible to establish how frequently spe-
cial investigative activity is conducted unlawfully but also how effectively these meas-
ures are applied – if special investigative activity is not applied in accordance with the 
law, it does not result in quality evidence. Thus, the rights of the public are violated ‘at 
their expense’.
How much and what kind of training have public prosecutors received to date 
regarding the approval of special investigative activity and other covert data 
collection measures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code?
Well trained public prosecutors are indispensible for the lawful and effective proposal 
and selection of special investigative activity and other covert data collection meas-
ures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code.
39  See above footnote.
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK
•	 “The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia” Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, No. 98/2006
•	 “Law on the Security-Information Agency” Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, Nos. 42/2002, 111/2009, 65/2014 – Constitutional Court Decision and 
22/2014
•	 “Law on Detective Activity” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 
104/2013
•	 “Law on Electronic Communications” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
Nos. 44/2010, 60/2013 – Constitutional Court Decision and 62/2014
•	 “Law on the Bases of Security Services Organization” Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Serbia, Nos. 116/2007 and 72/2012
•	 “Law on the Police” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 101/2005, 
63/2009 – Constitutional Court Decision and 92/2011
•	 “Law on the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency” Of-
ficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 88/2009, 55/2012 – Constitutional 
Court Decision and 17/2013
•	 “Criminal Procedure Code” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 
72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013 and 55/2014
•	 “Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism” Of-
ficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 20/2009, 72/2009 and 91/2010
•	 “Law on Classified Information” Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 
104/2009
•	 Law on Personal Data Protection, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
Nos. 97/2008, 104/2009 – state law, 68/2012 – Constitutional Court Decision and 
107/2012
•	 Law on the Ombudsman, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 79/2005 
and 54/2007
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•	 “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia” Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 52/2010 and 13/2011
•	 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia – Security Services Control Commit-
tee “Decision Regulating Direct Oversight of the Security Services in Accordance 
with the Law Regulating the Basic Organisation of the Security Services of the 
Republic of Serbia, the Laws on the Security Services and the Rules of Procedure 
of the National Assembly. Number 02-1322/13” Belgrade, 29 March 2013.

